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According to Becker (1968) participation in illegal activities is driven by many of the same eco-
nomic forces that motivate legitimate activities. Therefore, changes in labor market policies that
affect individuals’ incomes and prospects are likely to affect their criminal behavior as well. A case
in point is the Job Seeker’s Allowance introduced in the United Kingdom in 1996. The program
was instituted to reduce unemployment by decreasing the duration of unemployment beneﬁts. Ac-
cording to Machin and Marie (2004), this reform had the unfortunate effect of increasing crime.
Similarly, Fougere, Kramarz, and Pouget (2003) present some (mild) evidence that workers in
France who do not receive unemployment beneﬁts tend to commit more property crime. More
generally, Hoon and Phelps (2003) advocate the use of labor market policies, such as wage subsi-
dies, to reduce the enrollment of low-skilled workers in criminal activities.
Turning the Becker argument on its head suggests that changes in the crime sector could affect
the labor market. In the U.S., sentence lengths have been increased in several states, sentencing
guidelines have become tougher, and some states have moved to “three-strikes” rules. While it
is intuitively plausible that increased deterrence and/or punishment should reduce criminal activ-
ity, there is scant research on how this might affect job duration, employment, wages and other
outcomes of the labor market.
In this paper we develop a tractable model where crime and labor market outcomes are deter-
mined jointly. We use this model to assess, qualitatively and quantitatively, the effects of various
labor market and crime policies. Therefore, we adopt the description of the labor market proposed
by Pissarides (2000) where the terms of the employment contract are determined via bilateral bar-
gaining and where a free-entry condition of ﬁrms makes the job ﬁnding rate endogenous. Both
worker’s bargaining strength and the exit rate out-of-unemployment are important determinants of
the trade-off that workers face when deciding whether to undertake crime opportunities.
In the model all individuals receive random crime opportunities. The willingness to commit
an illegal act is represented by a reservation value for crime opportunities above which individuals
commit crime. This reservation value depends on current income, prospects for future income and
so on. It also depends on the punishment that an individual faces if being caught, which occurs
with some probability.
Since detected crimes are punished by periods of imprisonment, employed workers’ involve-
2ment in criminal activities imposes a negative externality on ﬁrms by reducing average job dura-
tion. This type of externality, which is well understood in models with on-the-job search (crime
can certainly be thought of in a similar way), can lead to inefﬁcient separations if the contract
space is restricted to ﬂat wages.1 We take the approach that employees and employers face no
liquidity constraints and can write contracts that generate efﬁcient turnover from the point of view
of a worker and employer. As shown by Stevens (2004) in a related context, the optimal contract
involves an up-front payment by the worker and a constant wage equal to the worker’s productiv-
ity. One can think of this optimal contract approximating features of existing contracts, such as
probationary periods or an upward sloping wage proﬁle. (For the sake of completeness, and to
assess the extent to which the assumption of an optimal contract matters, we also work out in the
Appendix a version of the model with an exogenous wage without a hiring fee.)
We prove that equilibrium exists and provide simple conditions for uniqueness.2 Individuals’
willingness to engage in criminal activities can be ranked according to their labor force status, with
unemployed workers being the least choosy in terms of which crime opportunities to undertake. To
highlight the tractability of the model, we provide a two-dimensional representation of the equi-
librium similar in spirit to that in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). This tractability allows us to
study analytically a broad range of policies and to consider various extensions (such as endogenous
human capital and participation in the labor force). In addition, we also calibrate a version of the
model with an endogenous distribution of the return to crime opportunities to U.S. data to examine
the quantitative effects of policy.
We show analytically that a more generous unemployment insurance system reduces the crime
rate of unemployed workers but the effect on the crime rate of employed workers depends on the
differencebetweentheaveragelengthofjailsentencesandtheaveragejobduration. Quantitatively,
the total crime rate increases, although the effect is small.
The effects of a change in worker’s compensation are also investigated.3 Higher worker’s bar-
gaining power leads to higher unemployment but it has ambiguous (and highly nonlinear) effects
on the crime rates of employed and unemployed workers. The quantitative effects on total crime
arelarge, comingmainlyfromthesharpreductioninthejob-ﬁndingrate. Becauseoftheendogene-
1See Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the extensions by Burdett and Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004).
2We also consider extensions of the model that are susceptible to generate multiple equilibria, e.g., by endogenizing
workers’ human capital; however, we ﬁnd it interesting that a benchmark version of the model predicts a unique
equilibrium.
3See Freeman (1999) for an extensive review on the relationship between crime and workers’ compensation.
3ity of the distribution of crime opportunities, the total crime rate falls substantially as bargaining
power becomes large, i.e., the economy collapses and so there is little to steal.
A a wage subsidy reduces the unemployment rate and overall crime. On the contrary, hiring
subsidiesthatreducethecostofadvertisingvacanciescanraisethecrimerateofemployedworkers.
From a normative standpoint, our analysis suggests that most labor market policies have a
negativeeffectonwelfare: thedistortionstheyintroduceinthelabormarketoutweightthepotential
beneﬁts in terms of crime. A noticeable exception is the wage subsidy case, having a signiﬁcant
and positive effect on welfare by reducing crime, as suggested by Hoon and Phelps (2003).
We also examine policies that affect the likelihood of catching criminals and the length of jail
sentences. The probability of apprehension and sentence lengths have large effects on crime with
virtually no effect on the labor market.
The closest paper to ours is that of Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003)– BLW hereafter. There
are several key differences between the two formalizations. First, while BLW adopt the wage post-
ing framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we employ the Pissarides model for the reasons
stated above. Second, in contrast to BLW we consider optimal employment contracts that inter-
nalize the effect of workers’ crime decisions on the duration of a match. In BLW the employment
contract is restricted to a constant wage which leads to a wage distribution and multiple equilibria.
Third, the endogenous participation of ﬁrms in our model provides a channel through which crim-
inal activities can distort the allocation and lower welfare. In contrast, the distortions introduced
by crime in BLW are due solely to the policy that consists of sending criminals to jail. Fourth, the
value of crime opportunities in our model are random draws from a distribution; this allows us to
formalize crime behavior as a standard sequential search problem and to obtain endogenous crime
rates for individuals in different states.
Huang, Liang, and Wang (2004) is also related to our analysis in that they employ a search-
theoretic framework with bilateral bargaining. In their model individuals specialize in criminal
activities while we let all agents, irrespective of their labor status, receive crime opportunities and
commit crimes. This distinction is important since in the data all types of individuals, in particular
employed ones, commit crimes. We formalize different access to crime by allowing an arrival rate
of crime opportunities that depends on labor force status.
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004) calibrate an equilibrium model of crime to explore
potential explanations for the decline in property crime over the past few decades. Their model
4does not have an explicit description of the labor market and is not set up to address how changes
in the criminal sector affects the labor market.4
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time, t, is continuous and goes on forever. The economy is composed of a unit-measure of
inﬁnitely-lived individuals and a large measure of ﬁrms. There is one ﬁnal good produced by
ﬁrms. Each individual is endowed with one indivisible unit of time that has two alternative, mutu-
ally exclusive uses: search for a job, work for a ﬁrm. In Section 5.2, we extend the model to allow
for a third use of time: working at home (out of the labor force).
Individuals are risk-neutral and discount at rate r > 0. They are not liquidity constrained and
can borrow and lend at rate r. An unemployed worker who is looking for a job enjoys utility ﬂow
b, which we interpret as the utility from not working.
Upon entering an employment relationship, a worker pays a hiring fee, φ, and receives a con-
stant wage, w, thereafter. We establish below that this type of contract is Pareto-optimal for a
worker and a ﬁrm. The pair (φ,w) will be determined through some bargaining solution.5
Firms are composed of a single job, either ﬁlled or vacant, and discount future proﬁts at rate
r > 0. Vacant ﬁrms are free to enter and pay a ﬂow cost, γ > 0, to advertise a vacancy. Vacant
ﬁrms produce no output while ﬁlled jobs produce y > b.
The labor market is subject to search-matching frictions. The ﬂow of hirings is given by the
aggregate matching function ζ(U,V) where U is the measure of unemployed workers actively
looking for jobs andV is the measure of vacant jobs. The matching function, ζ(·,·), is continuous,
strictly increasing, strictly concave with respect to each of its arguments and exhibits constant re-
turns to scale. Furthermore, ζ(0,·) = ζ(·,0) = 0 and ζ(∞,·) = ζ(·,∞) = ∞. Following Pissarides’
terminology, we deﬁne θ ≡V/U as labor market tightness. Each vacancy is ﬁlled according to a
4There is also an empirical literature on the relationship between the labor market and crime. See, for instance,
Grogger (1998) or Machin and Meghir (2004). Going further, Lochner and Moretti (2004) ﬁnd empirical evidence
that policies aimed at improving labor market opportunities, speciﬁcally increasing graduation rates, can substantially
reduce crime.
5Implicit in this formulation is that the ﬁrm commits to the terms of the employment contract. In particular, once
the worker pays the hiring fee the ﬁrm does not renege on the promised future wage. This type of commitment is
present for all wage determination mechanisms. Note also that ﬁrms have no incentive to ﬁre their workers once the
hiring fee has been paid since their expected proﬁts from opening a new vacancy is zero.
5Poisson process with arrival rate
ζ(U,V)
V ≡ q(θ). Similarly, each unemployed worker ﬁnds a job
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
ζ(U,V)
U = θq(θ). Filled jobs receive negative id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks, with a Poisson arrival rate s, that render matches unproﬁtable. The
measures of employed and unemployed workers are denoted ne and nu, respectively.
Individuals in the economy receive an opportunity to commit a crime according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate λi, where i indicates the individual’s state: i = u if unemployed and i = e
if employed. So, the availability of crime opportunities may depend on one’s labor force status.
The value of a crime is εm, where m ≥ 0 is a scale parameter and ε is a random draw from a
distribution G(ε) with support [0, ¯ ε]. We treat m as an exogenous parameter for the time being but
will endogenize it below.6
A worker who commits a crime is caught and sent to jail with probability π.7 The measure of
those in prison is denoted by np. When in jail an individual cannot make any productive use of
time but receives a ﬂow of utility x (which can be negative). A prisoner exits jail according to a
Poisson process with arrival rate δ. We assume that the average time spent in jail is independent
of the value of the crime, εm.8
A crime is described as a transfer of utility (or wealth) from the victim to the offender. Each
dollar stolen by criminals corresponds to a loss of 1+ω dollars incurred by victims. If ω = 0
crime is a pure transfer; whereas ω > 0 means that victims also suffer a nonpecuniary cost when
robbed. Crimes occur as follows. Each individual meets a potential offender who is unemployed
with Poisson rate nuλu, and a potential offender who is employed with Poisson rate λene.9 The
potential offender has a random opportunity to steal from his victim. Since the model is agnostic
about the distribution of wealth, we simply assume that the distribution of crime opportunities is
6An interpretation of m being exogenous is that of a local labor market where crime opportunities come from
outside the economy.
7Note that in our framework the probability of being caught is independent of the value of the crime. An alternative
is to have π as a function of the value of the crime, for example by assigning more police to larger crimes. We do not
know of any data in this regard to support one particular assumption over another.
8The length of incarceration has more to do with the violent nature of the crime and the number of past offenses
than the value of the crime. For example, the Sentencing Commission Guidlines suggests a period of incarceration
ranging from 0 to 6 months for larceny less than $10,000 (75% of thefts are under $10,000) and the criminal has not
been convicted more than once. If it is the second or third offense then the suggested penalty is 4-10 months. If the
theft is violent, such as a robbery, and the crime is still less than $10,000, the guidelines suggest incarceration for
33-41 months.
9The assumption that all individuals, including those in jail, are subject to crime is meant to capture the fact that
all individuals, even those in jail, can have their property stolen. Furthermore, it guarantees that being in jail does not
provide an advantage in terms of the security of one’s property that could make jail more attractive. Our results would
not be affected signiﬁcantly if prisoners are not subject to theft.
6independent of the victim’s labor force status.10 Hence, the expected loss from crime is
τc = nuλu(1+ω)Eu[ε]+λene(1+ω)Ee[ε], (1)
where Ei[ε] is the (endogenous) expected value of the crime committed by an individual with labor
force status i ∈ {u,e}. Firms do not suffer directly from criminal activities. Finally, individuals
have to pay taxes, τg, to the government. In order to avoid taxes affecting crime decisions directly,
we assume that the burden of taxes falls on all workers including those in jail. We denote τ =
τc+τg.
2.2 Discussion
A distinctive feature of our model relative to the standard Pissarides model, or the existing search
models of crime (e.g., BLW), is the form of the employment contract. Typically, search models of
the labor market assume that the employment contract involves only a constant wage: There is no
hiring fee or tenure-dependent compensation. In most instances, these restrictions on the contract
space are innocuous because the only thing that matters for the risk-neutral workers and ﬁrms is
the division of the match surplus (e.g. Shimer (1996)). Put differently, the same division of the
match surplus can be achieved with a constant wage, or with a hiring fee and a constant wage, or
with some other, more elaborate, wage-tenure contract.
The exact form of the employment contract is more relevant in the presence of search on the
job or, more generally, when workers can take actions that affect the duration of the match, such
as through crime opportunities. As pointed out by Shimer (2005b) and Stevens (2004), a constant
wage may fail to achieve a pairwise Pareto-efﬁcient outcome. Similarly, the restriction to ﬂat-
wage contracts in the wage-posting model of Burdett et al. (2003) generates an inefﬁcient turnover
of workers and, for some parameter values, a nondegenerate distribution of wages. Moreover,
standard bargaining solutions cannot always be used when the contract is restricted to a constant
wagesincethebargainingsetneednotbeconvex(BonillaandBurdett(2005); Shimer(2005b)). As
we show below, an employment contract composed of a hiring fee and a constant wage generates
a pairwise optimal outcome in our context. Given that this is the type of contract our model calls
10The loss due to crime is independent of one’s wealth, and in principle could be larger than one’s income or wealth.
For instance, an individual can be the victim of credit card fraud, or can have his car stolen even if he does not own it
(e.g., the car is on lease).
7for, it is the one we choose to adopt.11
Despite the adoption of the optimal contract being theoretically elegant, it may not be empir-
ically relevant. One may wonder if a hiring fee has any counterpart in reality. For instance, the
presence of liquidity constraints (especially for young and less skilled workers) may reduce the
feasibility of such contracts. Our view is that contracts with hiring fees approximate in a tractable
way some features of existing contracts. For instance, a contract with an upfront payment by the
worker is just an extreme version of a contract with an upward sloping wage proﬁle over time.
Moreover, many employment contracts have an initial probationary period during which wages are
lower.12
For the sake of completeness, Appendix B describes a version of the model without a hiring
fee and the wage is set according to some ad-hoc rent sharing rule. A more realistic approach
would be to allow for risk-aversion and liquidity constraints (see, e.g., Burdett and Coles (2003)).
Whiletheseassumptionswouldlikelygenerateasmootherwage-tenurecontract, andaninteresting
relationship between job tenure and crime involvement, tractability would be lost.
3 Bellman equations
This paper focuses on steady-state equilibria where the distribution of individuals across states, ne,
nu and np, and market tightness, θ, are constant over time. As a consequence, market tightness,
matching probabilities and crime rates are also time-invariant. In this section we write down the
ﬂow Bellman equations for individuals and ﬁrms and characterize the employment contract.
3.1 Individuals
An individual is in one of the following three states: unemployed (u), employed (e), or in prison
(p). Thevalueofbeinganindividualinstatei∈{u,e,p}isdenotedVi. TheﬂowBellmanequations
11The fact that a constant wage may be suboptimal when workers can engage in some opportunistic behavior (such
as crime opportunities or search on the job) mirrors the discussion about the “bonding critique” in the efﬁciency wage
literature. See Carmichael (1985) and Ritter and Taylor (1997)
12For a related discussion, see Chapter 5 in Mortensen (2003).
8for individuals’ value functions are








rVp = x−τ +δ (Vu−Vp), (4)
where [x]+ = max(x,0). Equation (2) has the following interpretation. An unemployed worker
enjoys a utility ﬂow of b−τ where b is the utility ﬂow from not working and τ is the sum of
the (expected) cost of being victimized and taxes. A job is found with an instantaneous probability
θq(θ). Upon taking a job an individual pays a hiring fee, φ (or receives an up-front payment if φ <
0), and enjoys the capital gain Ve−Vu. When unemployed the individual receives an opportunity
to commit a crime with instantaneous probability λu. The value of the crime opportunity is drawn
from the cumulative distribution G(ε). If a worker chooses to commit a crime she enjoys utility εm
but is at risk of being caught and sent to jail with probability π, in which case she suffers a capital
loss, Vp−Vu. From(3), anemployedworkerreceivesawagew, losesherjobwithaninstantaneous
probability s and has the opportunity to commit a crime with an instantaneous probability λe.
According to (4), an imprisoned worker receives consumption ﬂow x, suffers the loss τ, and exits
jail with an instantaneous probability δ. After release a prisoner joins the unemployment pool.
From (2) and (3) an individual in state i chooses to commit a crime whenever ε ≥ εi where
εum = π(Vu−Vp), (5)
εem = π(Ve−Vp), (6)
From (5)-(6) the value of the marginal crime that makes an individual in a given state indifferent
between undertaking the crime or not, εim, is equal to the expected cost of punishment, π(Vi−Vp).
3.2 Firms
Firms participating in the market can be in either of two states: they can hold a vacant job (v) or a
ﬁlled job (f). Firms’ ﬂow Bellman equations are










9According to (7), a vacancy incurs an advertising cost γ; ﬁnds an unemployed worker with an
instantaneous probability q(θ) in which case it receives the hiring fee, φ and enjoys the capital
gain Vf −Vv. According to (8), a ﬁlled job enjoys a ﬂow proﬁt y−w and is destroyed if a negative
idiosyncratic productivity shock occurs, with an instantaneous probability s, or if the worker com-
mits a crime and is caught, an event occurring with an instantaneous probability λeπ[1−G(εe)].





From (9), the ﬁrms’ surplus from a match, the sum of the value of a ﬁlled job and the hiring fee, is
equal to the average recruiting cost incurred by the ﬁrm.
3.3 Employment contract
To determine the details of the employment contract we deﬁne S ≡ Ve −Vu +Vf as the total
surplus of a match (Recall that Vv = 0). From (3) and (8),




Equation (10) has the following interpretation. A match generates a ﬂow surplus, y−τ −rVu,
composed of the output of the job minus taxes (including the loss due to victimization of the
worker) and the permanent income of an unemployed person, rVu. The match is destroyed if an
exogenous shock occurs, at Poisson rate s, or if the worker commits a crime and is caught. In
the latter case, the value S of the match is lost and the worker goes to jail which generates an
additional capital loss Vu−Vp. The value of the match also incorporates the crime opportunities
undertaken by the employed worker.
Suppose a worker and a ﬁrm could jointly determine the crime opportunities undertaken by the
worker. It can be seen from (10), that the surplus of the match is maximized if





Comparison of (6) and (11) reveals that if Vf > 0, the worker’s choice of which crime opportuni-
ties to undertake and the choice that maximizes the match surplus differ, i.e. the total surplus of
the match is not maximized. Employed workers commit “too much crime” because they do not
internalize the negative externality they impose on the ﬁrm if they are sent to jail.
10We show that by allowing the employment contract to include an upfront fee, φ, the worker
and the ﬁrm can reach a pairwise-efﬁcient outcome. The employment contract (φ,w) is determined






Lemma 1 The employment contract solution to (12) is such that
w = y, (13)
φ = (1−β)(Ve−Vu). (14)
Proofs of the lemmas and propositions can be found in the appendix. According to Lemma 1,
the wage is set to be equal to the worker’s productivity.13 Since the worker gets the entire output
generated by the match, and henceVf =0, this wage setting guarantees that the worker internalizes
the effect of his crime decision on the total surplus of the match. The up-front payment is used to
split the surplus of the match according to each agent’s bargaining power.14
4 Equilibrium
In this section we derive conditions for existence and uniqueness of an active (positive employ-
ment) equilibrium. We establish that the model has a simple recursive structure and can be reduced
to two equations and two unknowns, market tightness (θ) and the reservation value for crime op-
portunities (εu).
The free-entry condition of ﬁrms allows us to express the worker’s and ﬁrm’s surpluses from a





The gain from ﬁlling a vacancy is equal to the up-front payment, φ, which equals the average
recruiting cost incurred by the ﬁrm to ﬁll a vacancy. From (14), the expected surplus received by
13Since the ﬁrm makes no proﬁt after the hiring fee has been paid, it has no incentive to ﬁre the worker as the value
of a vacancy is no greater than the value of a ﬁlled job, i.e., Vf = Vv = 0.
14Alternatively, the optimal contract could take the form of a constant wage, w, and a payment from the worker to
the ﬁrm (a ﬁne) if the worker is caught committing a crime. This transfer would exactly compensate the ﬁrm for its
lost surplus.








The worker’s surplus from a match is
β
1−β times the expected recruiting costs incurred by ﬁrms.
Second, using the Bellman equations (2), (3) and (4), as well as the expression for the worker’s























Given θ, (17)-(18) determine a unique pair (εu,εe). Notice that (17)-(18) correspond to standard
optimal stopping rules. Also, (17) gives the ﬁrst relationship between εu and θ.
Next, weturntothedeterminationofmarkettightness. Substituting(16)into(2)andintegrating
the integral term in (2) by parts, gives the permanent income of an unemployed worker as:




















Given the thresholds εu and εe, (20) determines a unique θ. Note that, up to the last two terms
on the right-hand side, (20) is identical to the equilibrium condition in the Pissarides model. If
crime activities are more valuable for unemployed workers than for employed ones, i.e., the sum






















Equation(22)givesthesecondrelationshipbetweenεu andθ. Accordingto(22), ifλu[1−G(εu)]>
λe[1−G(εe)] then θ increases with εu. This condition is satisﬁed, for instance, if λu = λe.
12Finally, we characterize the steady-state distribution of individuals across states. The distribu-
tion (nu,ne,np) is determined by the following steady-state conditions:
sne+δnp = {θq(θ)+λuπ[1−G(εu)]}nu, (23)
θq(θ)nu = {s+λeπ[1−G(εe)]}ne, (24)
ne+nu+np = 1. (25)
According to (23) the ﬂows in and out of unemployment must be equal. The measure of indi-
viduals entering unemployment is the sum of the employed workers who lose their jobs, sne, and
the criminals who exit jail, npδ. The ﬂow of individuals exiting unemployment corresponds to
individuals ﬁnding jobs, θq(θ)nu, or unemployed individuals committing crimes and sent to jail,
λuπ[1−G(εu)]nu. Similarly, (24) prescribes that the ﬂows in and out of employment must be equal
in steady state. According to (25), individuals are either employed, unemployed, or in jail. Figure
1 diagrams the above-mentioned ﬂows.
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The equilibrium unemployment rate, u, is deﬁned as the fraction of individuals not in jail who





As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the unemployment rate decreases with market tightness
and increases with the job destruction rate which, in our model, is endogenous and depends on εe.
13We close the model by computing the expected instantaneous loss incurred by individuals from












We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium for the model.
Deﬁnition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is a list {θ, εu, εe, ne, nu, np,τc} such that: θ satisﬁes
(22); {εu, εe} satisﬁes (17)-(18); {ne, nu, np} satisﬁes (23)-(25) and τc satisﬁes (27).
As indicated above, the model is recursively solvable. First, the pair (θ,εu) is determined
jointly from (17) and (22). Second, knowing (θ,εu), one can use (21) to ﬁnd εe. Finally, given
(θ,εu,εe) the steady-state distribution (ne,nu,np) is obtained from (23)-(25).
Figure 2 represents the determination of the pair (θ,εu). We denoteCS (crime schedule) as the
curve representing (17) and JC (job creation) as the curve representing (22). Recall thatCS always
slopes upward while JC can slope upward or downward, depending on the the values of λe and λu.
In the case where λu =λe, the case we will focus on in the quantitative section, the two curves slope
upward. Along CS, as the number of vacancies per unemployed increases, unemployed workers
are less likely to commit crimes. Along JC, as the frequency of crime by the unemployed falls, the
supply of vacancies in the market increases. The Beveridge curve (26) is denoted BC(εe). It shifts
with the reservation value εe which, from (21), is uniquely determined from θ and εu.
In Figure 2, the curves CS and JC intersect once. The following lemma establishes that this
result holds in general.
Lemma 2 In the space (εu,θ) the curve JC intersects the curveCS from above.
The determination of equilibrium is reminiscent of the one in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
where labor market tightness and the job destruction rate are determined jointly. The CS curve
in our model is analogous to the job destruction curve in the Mortensen-Pissarides model in that
workers’ crime decisions affect the duration of a job.
The following proposition provides a simple condition under which there is a unique equilib-
rium with a positive number of jobs. Denote ε0
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[1−G(ε)]dε > 0. (28)
In any such equilibrium, εe > εu.
Proposition 1 shows that an equilibrium exists and is unique. So despite the possibility of
strategic complementarities between individuals’ crime decisions and ﬁrms’ entry decisions, there
is no multiple steady-state equilibria in this model. (We will see later that there are simple ways
to get multiplicity of equilibria.) The condition (28) for ﬁrms entering the market requires that
the rate at which unemployed workers receive crime opportunities is not too high compared to the
arrival rate of crime opportunities for employed workers; obviously, it is satisﬁed if λe = λu in
which case (28) reduces to y > b.
Proposition 1 also shows that unemployed workers are less picky than other individuals when
choosing which crime opportunities to accept. To see this, note that employed workers are paid
their productivity, which is larger than the income they receive when unemployed. Therefore, the
opportunity cost of being caught and sent to jail is higher for employed workers. In the particular
case where λu =λe the crime rate of unemployed workers is larger than the crime rate of employed
workers, a fact that is present in the data.15
15Data from the Survey of Prison Inmates in State and Federal Correction Facilities gives the labor force status at
15The following Proposition provides a condition under which the equilibrium is characterized
by no criminal activities. Denote ˆ θ the value of market tightness that solves
(r+s)γ
q( ˆ θ)
= (1−β)(y−b)−β ˆ θγ. (29)








then the equilibrium is such that θ = ˆ θ and no crime occurs.
According to Proposition 2, there is no crime in equilibrium provided that the probability of
being caught is sufﬁciently high and the time spent in jail is sufﬁciently long. In this case the model
reduces to the Pissarides model.
So far we have taken the distribution of crime opportunities, mG(ε), as exogenous. This as-
sumption is reasonable if one envisions the economy as a local labor market and the crime op-
portunities as coming from outside the neighborhood. If one thinks of an entire economy, the
distribution of crime opportunities is presumably endogenous and depends on the distribution of
wealth, income and other characteristics of the economy. We capture this idea by assuming that m
is a continuous function, µ, of the endogenous variables (εe,εu,θ). This is consistent with several
interpretations. For instance, m could be the aggregate output in the economy, m = ney where ne is
an implicit function of θ and εe.16 We will assume that µ(εe,εu,θ) > 0 if and only if θ > 0 –there
are crime opportunities as long as the labor market is active.
Proposition 3 Assume m = µ(εe,εu,θ), where µ is continuous, bounded above and strictly posi-
tive iff θ > 0. Then, there exists an active equilibrium (µ > 0 and θ > 0) provided that y > b.
So, as long as workers’ productivity is greater than the income of unemployed workers there
exists an equilibrium with an active labor market. While we can show existence of equilibrium for
an endogenous distribution of crime opportunities, we can no longer guarantee uniqueness.
the time of arrest. This allows us to calculate that the probability of committing a crime when unemployed as 17% and
when employed as 3%.
16Alternatively, output could be deﬁned as ney−vγ, where vγ represents the hiring costs incurred by ﬁrms.
16To investigate the implications of various policies on welfare in the quantitative section, we
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In this section we consider two extensions of our model that are relevant for the relationship be-
tween the labor market and crime. First, we endogenize workers’ productivity by introducing a
training decision for unemployed workers. Second, we introduce a decision to participate in the
labor force.
5.1 Human capital
As discussed by Freeman (1999) and Lochner and Moretti (2004), the accumulation of human cap-
ital by workers is an important determinant of both labor market outcomes and crime decisions. In
the following, we lay out a simple extension of our model that endogenizes workers’ productivity.
Following Boone and van Ours (2004), we assume that unemployed workers can choose a training
intensity that determines their level of productivity (general human capital) when matched with a
ﬁrm. To achieve a productivity level y, the unemployed worker must incur a disutility cost χ(y)
where χ0(y) > 0 and χ00(y) > 0.19 Once employed, the worker maintains his level of productivity
(e.g., through learning by doing).
17See Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000) for a similar approach.
18Consider a planner who can choose ﬁrms’ decisions to open vacancies and workers’ decisions to commit crimes
but who is subject to the matching frictions and who takes π, the technology to catch criminals, and δ, the jail sentence,
as given. Normalize individuals’ utility ﬂow in jail to x = 0 and assume that b > 0 so that prisoners get the lowest
utility. As long as π > 0 the planner would always want to have no crime since otherwise some individuals end up
in jail where they are unproductive. Furthermore, the socially efﬁcient market tightness is the one that would prevail
in the economy without crime when the Hosios (1990) condition is implemented. The ﬁrst-best allocation can be
decentralized only if there is no punishment (π = 0) and crimes are pure transfers (ω = 0). Even if ω = π = 0, the
presence of crimes affects the entry decision of ﬁrms so that the Hosios (1990) condition for efﬁciency needs to be
adjusted unless employed and unemployed workers receive crime opportunities at the same rate.
19Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that human capital fully depreciates from one instant to the next so
that the stock of human capital only depends on the investment ﬂow.










where we used the fact that, from Nash bargaining, (Ve−Vu−φ) = βS. According to (32),
the unemployed worker chooses his productivity, and hence the size of the match surplus with
his future employer. The cost associated with a certain productivity level is due to training. The
ﬁrst-order condition for y is
χ0(y) = θq(θ)βS 0(y). (33)
So, the marginal cost of training is equal to the marginal beneﬁt of training which is comprised
of three elements: the marginal increase in the match surplus times the worker’s share in the
match surplus times the job ﬁnding rate. As is standard in the search literature, in the presence
of bargaining the worker’s investment in human capital tends to be too low because of a holdup
problem.
In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that λe = 0, i.e., only unemployed work-
ers receive crime opportunities.20 From (10), the expression for the match surplus is S(y) =







(where χ0−1 is the inverse of χ0.) The worker’s productivity is increasing with market tightness
and workers’ bargaining power. From the equilibrium conditions (17) and (22), θ and εu are
increasing functions of y (See Proposition 9). So, there are strategic complementarities between
ﬁrms’ decisions to open vacancies and workers’ decisions to invest in training. Hence, depending
on the shape of the function χ(y) the model can exhibit multiple equilibria: Equilibria with high
productivity, a tight labor market and low crime can coexist with equilibria with low productivity,
depressed labor market and high crime.21 Even in the absence of multiple equilibria, the model
allows for strong spillover effects of policies aimed at reducing workers’ training cost. If the
marginal cost of training is reduced, workers accumulate more human capital which entices ﬁrms
to open more vacancies, leading workers to undertake even more training.
20We do not endogenize the crime rate of employed workers in order to avoid technical difﬁculties with the
concavity of the worker’s problem. One can show, however, that a necessary condition for optimality is χ0(y) =
θq(θ)β [r+s+πλe(1−G(εe))]
−1.
21Search labor models with endogenous human capital can generate multiplie equilibria even without crime deci-
sions. See, e.g., Acemoglu (1997).
185.2 Participation in the labor force
The Survey of Inmates documents that a signiﬁcant fraction of property crimes are committed
by individuals who are neither employed nor searching actively for a job. Following Pissarides
(2000, ch. 7) our model can be easily extended to account for a labor force participation decision.
Suppose that an individual who is out of the labor force enjoys utility ﬂow κ (expressed in terms
of consumption of the ﬁnal good) and receives crime opportuntites at Poisson rate λo.22 The
distribution of the κ’s across individuals is H(κ). We assume that κ does not affect the utility of
unemployed workers because of the indivisibilities in the use of time.
The ﬂow Bellman equations for an individual out of the labor force is




From (35), an individual out of the labor force enjoys utility κ minus taxes and the expected cost of
being victimized and receives the opportunity to commit a crime with an instantaneous probability
λo. He chooses to commit a crime whenever ε ≥ εo(κ) where
εo(κ)m = π[Vo(κ)−Vp(κ)] (36)
From (35), the utility from staying at home is increasing with κ. Hence, there exists a threshold
κu, the solution to Vo(κu)=Vu, such that an individual chooses not to participate in the labor force
if κ ≥ κu. From (5) and (36), εo(κu) = εu; the marginal worker who is indifferent between not
participating in the labor force or searching for a job undertakes the same crime opportunities as









The instantaneous utility from staying at home, the left-hand side of (37), is equal to the sum of
the income ﬂow received by an unemployed worker, the expected surplus from ﬁnding a job and
the difference in the returns from criminal activities for unemployed individuals and individuals
out of the labor force, the right-hand side of (37). Other things equal, as the labor market becomes
tighter, individuals have higher incentives to participate in the market. Also, if there are more
22One can think of κ as the return from home production or as the utility from leisure activities (such as reading or
going to the theater).
19opportunities to commit crimes when unemployed, (λu > λo), individuals tend to participate more.








Finally, we characterize the steady-state distribution of individuals across states. Deﬁne ni(κ)
such that
R
E ni(κ)dκ is the measure of individuals in state i whose utility at home is κ ∈ E. Con-
sider individuals who do not participate in the labor force, κ ≥ κu. The condition that the ﬂows
into and out of each state are equal implies
no(κ)λoπ[1−G(εo(κ))] = δnp(κ), (39)
no(κ)+np(κ) = h(κ), (40)
where h(κ) is the density function associated with H(κ). According to (39) the ﬂow of individuals
from out-of-the-labor-force to jail, no(κ)λoπ[1−G(εo(κ))], has to be equal to the ﬂow of indi-
viduals from jail to out-of-the-labor-force, δnp(κ). Consider next workers who participate in the
labor market (κ < κu). The distribution [nu(κ),ne(κ),np(κ)] obeys the ﬂow equations (23) and
(24) and ne(κ)+nu(κ)+np(κ) = h(κ).
The equilibrium unemployment rate u, deﬁned as the fraction of individuals in the labor force
who are unemployed, is still given by (26). The participation rate is computed as the fraction of










Asbefore, themodelcanbesolvedrecursively. Inparticular, itiseasytoshowthatthevariables
κu and εo(κ) do not affect the equilibrium conditions for θ, εe and εu. Using the Bellman equations









Hence, the crime decision of individuals out of the labor force is determined independently from
other labor market variables. From (42), εo(κ) is an increasing function of κ so that individuals
with higher utilities at home commit fewer crimes.
Proposition 4 In any equilibrium where θ > 0, εe > εu and εo(κ) ≥ εu for all κ ≥ κu.
20The proof of Proposition 4 is straightforward and is therefore omitted. It shows that unem-
ployed workers are less picky than individuals out-of-the-labor-force when choosing which crime
opportunities to commit.
6 Calibrated example
We calibrate the model with endogenous participation in the labor force and endogenous distribu-
tion of crime opportunities (m is equal to the aggregate output of the economy). 23 The unit of
time corresponds to one year and the rate of time preference is set to r = 0.048. The output from
a match is normalized to y = 1. The ﬂow of utility when unemployed is b = 0.4.24 We follow
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and assume that the distribution of utilities in the home sector H(κ)
is exponential. We calibrate the mean of the distribution, µh = 0.844, so the model’s participation
rate matches the participation rate in 2004, which was 66%.
The matching function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, ζ(U,V) = AUηV1−η with constant
returns to scale and we set η = 0.5, which is in the ballpark of estimates in the literature (see
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). We set the bargaining power of the worker β = 0.5. Setting
β = η = 0.5 means the wage internalizes the congestion and thick market externalities associated
with ﬁrms’ entry decisions, (see Hosios, 1990).25
We construct the job ﬁnding and job separation rates using the methodology in Shimer (2005a).
For the years 1951-2003 the job ﬁnding rate is 0.45 per month, implying that the annualized ex-
pected number of job offers, θq(θ), is 5.40. The parameters A and γ are chosen to match the
average job ﬁnding rate and the average v−u ratio. In the model the vacancy to unemployment
ratio, θ, is arbitrary and normalized to one. Therefore, we set A = 5.40 and γ = 0.513.26 The
job separation rate is found to be 0.034, implying an annualized rate of 0.408, i.e., jobs last, on
average, about 2 years.
23We note at the outset of this section that many of the parameters and targets will differ depending on the population
of interest. For example, the job destruction rate is three times the average for those age 16-24 (those more at risk of
committing crime) and the unemployment rate is substantially higher than for the sample using all workers. Therefore,
the quantitative ﬁndings depend upon the group being observed.
24The choice of the value for b, taken from Shimer (2005a) is controversial, see Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006)
for an alternative calibration.
25However, as shown above, it does not guarantee that equilibrium is constrained-efﬁcient because of the presence
of crime opportunities. Our value for η is between those given in Shimer (2005a) and Flinn (2006).
26For a given job ﬁnding rate, θq(θ), θ and γ appear as a product in the equilibrium conditions. Letting Θ ≡ θγ,
irrespective of the target for θ the model will generate the same Θ. Hence, one can normalize θ to one without loss of
generality.
21The crimes considered are Type I property crimes as deﬁned by the FBI, which includes
larceny, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.27 The FBI deﬁnes Forgery, Fraud, and Embezzlement as
a Type II offense and does not collect the number of these types of crimes. The crime rate (crimes
per 1000 persons) is taken from the Uniform Crime Reports for the population sixteen and over.
The probability of being caught is derived from the number sent to prison divided by the num-
ber of crimes, implying π = 0.019. We exclude those sentenced to probation when calculating the
probability of being caught because individuals on probation or parole may not be forced out of
employment. We assume that the technology to catch criminals is costly, and maintaining individ-
uals in jail involves some real resources. Following ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000), the
cost of a technology, π, takes the form
π = 1−C(π)−ν,
and their estimate is ν = 0.044. The cost of a prisoner is estimated to be $22,650.28 We choose
the level of taxes to ﬁnance both types of expenditures on crime. The mean length of incarceration
for those convicted of a property crime was 16 months in 2002, so that δ = 0.75. Since we do not
have much information on the utility or disutility from being in jail, we let x = 0.29
The average amount stolen is approximately $1243, calculated as the ratio of the dollar value
stolen divided by the number of crimes. The average per capita loss from crime is calculated by
taking the dollar value stolen divided by the number of individuals and normalized by the wage,
implying τc = 0.002.30 We assume that the distribution of the value of crime opportunities G(ε)
is exponential and allow for the endogeneity of the returns to crime, so that aggregate output is the
scale factor of this distribution, m = ney.31 We choose the mean of the exponential, µg, to target
the average amount stolen. The remaining parameters λe = λu = λo target the overall crime rate.
Weighting the expected dollar value stolen in each state by the proportion of crimes committed
27See Cozzi (2005) for an analysis on the link between drugs and crime.
28The estimate for the cost of a prisoner comes from the survey State Prison Expenditures (2001) which includes
the operating and capital costs of holding an inmate.
29We have tested different values for x and have veriﬁed that the calibration is basically unaffected. The threshold
values εi fall as x rises, which decreases our target for µg. The effects on the arrival rates of crime are found to be quite
small.
30The total number of property crimes is reported in the Uniform Crime Reports, 2004, Table 1. The total dollar
amount lost from crime is published in the Uniform Crime Reports 2004, Table 24. The population is non-institutional
as deﬁned and calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
31The log-normal and uniform distributions were also tried. The results from the log-normal distribution were not
remarkably different. In contrast, the uniform distribution resulted in the calibrated values for the arrival rates of crime
opportunities to be very low, nearly two hundred times lower than under the exponential.
22in each state gives the result µg = 0.0167 and λe = λu = λo = 0.599. Finally, Cohen (1988)
calculates the average costs of property crime to the victim, including pain and suffering, to be
$1374.32 Therefore, we calibrate ω = 0.105.
In calibrating the model we compute a constant wage, ¯ w, which is equivalent to the wage proﬁle
of a worker including the payment of the hiring fee. This is done using the following result,
y = ¯ w+{r+s+λeπ[1−G(εe)]}φ. (43)
We set y = 1 by assumption, and using the chosen parameters, ﬁnd the constant wage, ¯ w, to be
0.96 of productivity, y. We use median weekly earnings in the CPS as our measure of ¯ w and after
converting to an annual basis ﬁnd ¯ w = $31,616. We then normalize all dollar ﬁgures in the data
(taxes, average amount stolen, cost of imprisonment, etc.) by ¯ w/0.96 = $33,051.
Table 1 provides a summary of the parameters used in the calibration.
Table 1: Parameters
r 0.048 real interest rate
b 0.400 unemployed utility ﬂow
β 0.500 bargaining power of workers
η 0.500 elasticity of matching function
µh 0.844 mean of exponential home utility distribution
γ 0.513 ﬂow recruiting cost
s 0.408 job destruction rate
A 5.400 efﬁciency of matching technology
x 0.000 utility ﬂow when in jail
π 0.019 apprehension probability
δ 0.750 rate of exit from jail
λi 0.599 arrival rate of crime opportunities
µg 0.0167 mean of exponential crime distribution
ω 0.105 dead-weight loss from crime
7 Labor market policies
There are a number of papers that analyze how the labor market may affect crime. Machin and
Marie (2004), show that changes in unemployment beneﬁts affected crime in the U.K. Fougere
32We calculate the cost of crime to the victim by taking the loss for each type of property crime, adjusting by the
CPI, and then averaging the costs from the different classiﬁcations by their proportion of Type I property crimes.
23et al. (2003) present evidence that workers in France who do not receive unemployment beneﬁts
tend to commit more property crime. Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) document that work-
ers’ compensation is an important determinant of crime. Boone and van Ours (2004) discuss the
effectiveness of various “active” labor market policies and argue that policies aimed at increasing
workers’ human capital are more successful to bring unemployed workers back to work. Lochner
(2004) argues that the accumulation of human capital could be effective in reducing crime. Hoon
and Phelps (2003) advocate the use of wage subsidies as a policy instrument to reduce the enroll-
ment of low-skilled workers in criminal activities. In this section we examine qualitatively and
quantitatively how changes in such labor market policies affect crime and labor market outcomes.
7.1 Unemployment beneﬁts
Over the last decade several countries have reduced the generosity of their unemployment insur-
ance systems in order to increase the incentives of the unemployed to accept jobs and to reduce
pressure on wages, for example the Job Seekers Allowance in the U.K. To illustrate the effects of
unemployment beneﬁts in our model, we consider an increase in the income ﬂow, b, received by
unemployed workers ﬁnanced by an increase in τg. Note that b is composed of the utility of not
working, 0.4, and transfers received from the government, b−0.4..33
Proposition 5 Assume m is exogenous. An increase in b: reduces θ; raises εu; decreases εe if
δ > s and increases it if δ < s.
In Figure 2, for given θ, an increase in b provides unemployed workers with lower incentives
to commit crimes: The curve CS shifts to the right. For given εu, an increase in b raises the threat
point of workers when bargaining so that fewer ﬁrms enter the market: The curve JC shifts down-
ward. Although the overall effect seems ambiguous, Proposition 5 establishes that the measure of
vacancies per unemployed falls as well as unemployed workers’ incentives to commit crimes. It
could also be checked that a higher b raises κu and hence a larger fraction of individuals participate
in the labor force.
Changing the value of being unemployed will also affect crime decisions of the employed.
Suppose that the value of being unemployed, Vu, increases. The crime rate of employed workers
33Unemployment insurance beneﬁts, in practice, require certain eligibility conditions and are usually terminated
after a ﬁxed number of periods. We abstract from these in the model and calibration. For a more detailed treatment,
see Holmlund (1998).
24depends on the average jail sentence and job duration because employed workers and individuals
in jail will ultimately end up in the pool of unemployed.34 The transition from employment to
unemployment occurs at rate s, while the transition from jail to unemployment occurs at rate δ.
If δ > s then the value of being in jail tends to increase relatively more, raising the incentive to
commit crimes. In contrast, if δ < s then employed workers commit fewer crimes.
Quantitatively, δ is almost twice s, therefore the crime rate increases for those employed when
b rises, though only slightly, from 0.05 to 0.051 as shown in Table 2.35 In addition, the ﬁndings
suggest that, in contrast to the previous studies that focus on the partial equilibrium effect of unem-
ployment beneﬁts on the crime rate of unemployed workers, overall crime increases with the level
of unemployment beneﬁts, although the change is quite small, from 42.4 to 42.6. A change in b
has a negative effect on welfare by altering ﬁrms’ decisions to enter the market. For our numerical
example, the best policy is no change in b.36
Table 2: Effects of Changing Unemployment Beneﬁts (b)
b
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Labor Force
Employed (%) 61 61 61 61 61
Unemployed (%) 4 4 5 5 6
Not in Labor Force (%) 34 34 34 34 33
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.049 0.05 0.05 0.051 0.051
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.074 0.073 0.072 0.07 0.068
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023
Total Crime Rate (per 1000 persons) 41.9 42.2 42.4 42.6 42.6
Change in Welfare -0.05% -0.01% – -0.02% -0.1%
7.2 Workers’ bargaining strength
In the following, we will consider two different policies that affect payments to workers. We
start with the effect of a change in workers’ bargaining power. While β may not necessarily be
34A related result can be found in Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003).
35The job destruction rate is sensitive to the population of interest. Speciﬁcally, the job destruction rate is three
times the average for those age 16-24, or s = 1.1, but relatively the same for females, s = 0.456. Therefore, it is
possible to observe different comparative statics depending upon the group being studied.
36Labor force percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
25viewed as a policy parameter, it may be inﬂuenced by government’s tolerance vis-a-vis unions, for
instance.
Proposition 6 Assume m is exogenous. An increase in β:
• reduces θ;
• increases εu if β < η(θ) and decreases it if β > η(θ);
• increases εe if δ > s and β > η(θ) or δ < s and β < η(θ), and increases it otherwise.
An increase in β has two effects on unemployed worker’s utility. On the one hand, workers
enjoy a larger share of the match surplus which tends to make them better-off (they pay a lower
hiringfee). Ontheotherhand, ahigherβ reducesﬁrms’incentivestoopenvacancies, andtherefore
also reduces the job ﬁnding rate of workers. The former effect dominates if β < η. In this case,
εu increases so that the unemployed workers are less likely to engage in crime, and more agents
participate in the labor force. If β > η then the opposite happens. By similar reasoning, it could
be shown that an increase in workers’ bargaining power raises participation in the labor force if
β < η(θ) and decreases it if β > η(θ)
The effect of changing β on the crime rate of employed workers is analogous to that of unem-
ployment beneﬁts described above, i.e., it depends on the ordering of δ to s.
Quantitatively, the relationship between the total crime rate and β is non-monotonic and highly
non-linear. Reducing workers’ bargaining power from 0.5 to 0.01, corresponding to a reduction of
workers’ compensation (compensation is ¯ w, deﬁned in 43) of about 30%, generates a reduction in
the total crime rate of about 35%. On the other hand, raising workers’ bargaining power from 0.5
to 0.99, which corresponds to an increase in workers’ compensation of 5%, decreases total crime
roughly six fold. These non-linearities are explained by the large changes in workers’ job ﬁnding
rate and the average value of crime opportunities. Unemployment decreases from 5% to 1% as β is
reduced from 0.5 to 0.01 but it increases from 5% to 28% as β is increased to 0.99. Moreover, as β
increases from 0.5 to 0.99 the value of crime opportunities plummets due to a fall in employment
(and hence, m).
Welfare is maximized for β close to 0.5. A change of β away from 0.5 distorts the entry of
jobs —the Hosios (1990) condition is not satisﬁed. The welfare loss associated with this distortion
outweights any potential gain in terms of reducing the extent of criminal activities.
26Table 3: Changes in Bargaining Power, (β)
β 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99
¯ w 0.682 0.829 0.876 0.957 0.986 0.991 0.997
Labor Force
Employed (%) 55% 61% 62% 61% 52% 46% 27%
Unemployed (%) 1% 1% 2% 5% 12% 17% 28%
Not in Labor Force (%) 45% 38% 36% 34% 36% 38% 45%
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.023 0.042 0.048 0.05 0.028 0.017 0.001
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.102 0.088 0.083 0.072 0.055 0.046 0.017
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.024 0.017 0.013 0.003
Total Crime Rate 27.6 37.7 41.4 42.4 27.4 20.2 6.5
Change in Welfare -10.73% -4.46% -2.45% – -2.51% -4.63% -11.42%
7.3 Wage subsidies
Suppose that the government gives each employed worker a salary supplement equal to ϕ. (Think
of ϕ as the discounted sum of the payments made by the government to employed workers. It
would be equivalent to give the subsidy to the ﬁrm.) At the time of the negotiation both parties
take into account the salary supplement so that the employment contract solves




Therefore, φ = (1−β)(Ve−Vu+ϕ) and w = y. The wage supplement reduces the upfront pay-
ment made by the worker while the subsequent wage is unchanged. (Equivalently, the wage proﬁle
is less steep.) The equilibrium conditions for εe and εu are still given by (17) and (18). The


















Proposition 7 Assume m is exogenous. An increase in ϕ: raises θ, εe and εu.
Wage subsidies are payments made by the government to each successful match. They promote
job creation and they lower the incentives of employed and unemployed workers to commit crimes.
Quantitatively, a wage supplement equal to 10% of worker’s yearly output reduces the crime rate
by about 5%. The optimal wage subsidy is 0.026.
27Table 4: Effects of Wage Subsidies (ϕ)
ϕ
0.0 0.026 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Labor Force
Employed (%) 61 62 62 63 64 65
Unemployed (%) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Not in Labor Force (%) 34 33 33 32 31 31
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.05 0.05 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.046
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.072 0.071 0.07 0.069 0.068 0.066
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023
Total Crime Rate 42.4 42.1 41.9 41.3 40.7 40.1
Change in Welfare - 0.002% 0% -0.015% -0.046% -0.09%
7.4 Subsidies to vacancy creation
Consider a policy that subsidizes the creation of vacancies. We interpret such a policy in our model
as a reduction in γ.
Proposition 8 Assume m is exogenous. A decrease in γ: raises θ and εu; decreases εe if δ > s
and increases it if δ < s.
By reducing the cost to open vacancies, hiring subsidies promote job creation. Unemployed
workers beneﬁt from a higher job ﬁnding rate and therefore reduce their involvement in crime.
Employed workers commit more crimes if δ >s. (The intuition is similar to the one for an increase
in b or β.) So the overall effect on crime is ambiguous. Quantitatively, reducing the hiring cost
from .51 to .41 leads to an increase in crime of about 4%. (This result is surprisingly different
from the one derived for the wage subsidies.) We assume hiring subsidies are taxed by a lump sum
transfer. Therefore, welfare is obtained by subtracting nuθdγ from (31) where dγ is the amount of
the hiring subsidy to each vacancy, corresponding to the tax necessary to ﬁnance the reduction in
γ. For our calibration, the introduction of hiring subsidies lowers welfare.
Notice that a policy that would increase the effectiveness of the matching process between
unemployed workers and vacancies (think of an increase in A), e.g., by promoting employment
agencies, is qualitatively equivalent to a reduction in γ.
28Table 5: Effects of Hiring Subsidies (γ)
γ
0.31 0.41 0.51 0.61 0.71
Labor Force
Employed (%) 63 62 61 61 60
Unemployed (%) 4 4 5 5 5
Not in Labor Force (%) 33 34 34 34 34
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.055 0.053 0.05 0.048 0.046
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.071
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023
Total Crime Rate 45.9 44 42.4 41 39.8
Change in Welfare -0.15% -0.03% – -0.02% -0.06%
7.5 Worker’s productivity
In the following, we consider the effects of an exogenous increase in workers’ productivity. (See
Section 5.1 for a methodology to endogenize y).
Proposition 9 Assume m is exogenous. An increase in y: increases θ, εe and εu.
As workers’ productivity, y, increases a larger measure of ﬁrms enter the market. Graphically,
the JC curve shifts upward and both θ and εu increase. The wage, which is equal to productivity,
increases, which reduces the crime rate of employed workers.
The calibration adds another dimension to the relationship between productivity and the crime
rate. Speciﬁcally, as productivity rises so does the value of crime opportunities. Therefore, the
opportunity costs of committing crime is rising at the same time as the average beneﬁt. Quan-
titatively, the opportunity cost of being caught outpaces the rising value of crime. In particular,
increasing output by 10% decreases the probability of committing crime for each labor force status
by roughly 10%.37
37In principle, we should also take into account the training cost to assess the welfare effects of a change in y.
29Table 6: Effects of Changing Productivity (y)
y
0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1
Labor Force
Employed (%) 57 59 61 63 65
Unemployed (%) 5 5 5 5 5
Not in Labor Force (%) 38 36 34 32 30
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.055 0.053 0.05 0.048 0.046
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.078 0.075 0.072 0.069 0.066
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023
Total Crime Rate 44.7 43.6 42.4 41.2 39.8
Change in Welfare -4.97% -2.53% – 2.61% 5.29%
8 Crime policies
Imposing harsher punishments on criminals or increasing apprehension probabilities are obvious
ways to reduce crime.38 However, such changes may also affect the labor market through the
outcome of the bargaining process and the duration of jobs. In the following we consider: policies
that improve the technology to catch criminals and punishment through the length of jail sentences.
8.1 Apprehension
The use of new scientiﬁc techniques and information technologies can raise the probability of
catching criminals. In our model, the effects of an increase in π on the labor market are ambiguous.
On the one hand, a higher π tends to reduce employed workers’ incentives to commit crimes. On
the other hand, criminals are caught more often, which increases the rate of job destruction. The
overall effect on job duration is ambiguous and market tightness can increase or fall.
The quantitative ﬁndings with respect to π are substantial as seen in Table 7. Increasing the
probability of being caught committing a crime by about 10% cuts the total crime rate by about
30%. A higher probability to catch criminals raises market tightness, but the effect is small.39
38Levitt (2004) argues that crime has fallen in the 90’s because of an increase in police surveillance. Bedard and
Helland (2000) ﬁnd sizeable deterrence effects of custody rate and punitiveness changes on female crime. They ﬁnd
that a 10% rise in the custody rate for women reduces female violent crime by approximately 5%. Increasing the
average within state prison distance by 40 miles reduces the female violent crime rate by approximately 7%.
39The optimal value of π, 0.061 is given in the last column of the table; however, it is sensitive to the assumption
30Table 7: Changes in Criminal Apprehension(π)
π
0.017 0.018 0.019 0.02 0.021 0.061
Labor Force
Employed (%) 61 61 61 61 61 61
Unemployed (%) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Not in Labor Force (%) 34 34 34 34 34 34
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.065 0.057 0.05 0.044 0.039 0
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.09 0.08 0.072 0.064 0.057 0.001
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.018 0
Total Crime Rate 55.2 48.4 42.4 37.2 32.6 0.2
Change in Welfare -0.03% -0.01% – 0.01% 0.03% 0.16%
8.2 Jail sentences
It is well accepted that crime deterrence involves some degree of punishment for convicted crim-
inals. Sentence lengths have been increased in several states, sentencing guidelines have become
tougher, and some states have moved to “three-strikes” rules. The next proposition characterizes
the effect of punishment on the labor market and crime.
Proposition 10 Assume m is exogenous and λe = λu. An increase in δ: decreases θ; decreases εe
and εu.
An increase in δ, the Poisson rate at which an individual exits jail, moves the CS curve to
the left. Since the punishment for committing crimes is weaker, both unemployed and employed
workers commit more crimes and ﬁrms open fewer vacancies. Quantitatively, if the average dura-
tion spent in jail rose by 2 months, we would see a drop in total crime by a factor of one quarter.
Note that the labor market is unaffected, suggesting that one can likely ignore the effects of crime
policies on the labor market.
The quantitative ﬁndings with respect to δ are substantial as seen in Table 8. Increasing the
rate of release after incarceration from 0.75 to 0.8 (corresponding to a decline of about one month
in jail) increases the total crime rate by about 15%.40
that all individuals receive crime opportunities at the same rate (See our discussion in the section on welfare) and the
31Table 8: Changes in Jail Sentences(δ)
δ
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 < 0.035
Labor Force
Employed (%) 61 61 61 61 61 61
Unemployed (%) 5 5 5 5 5 5
Not in Labor Force (%) 34 34 34 34 34 34
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.037 0.044 0.05 0.057 0.064 0
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.053 0.062 0.072 0.081 0.091 0
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.016 0.02 0.024 0.029 0.033 0
Total Crime Rate 30.8 36.5 42.4 48.4 54.5 0
Change in Welfare 0.03% 0.01% – -0.01% -0.03% 0.17
9 Conclusion
A search-theoretic model is constructed and calibrated in which labor market outcomes and crimes
are determined jointly. The description of the labor market follows the canonical model of Pis-
sarides (2000) extended to include a participation decision. Criminal activities are described in
accordance with Becker (1968). Individuals’ willingness to commit crimes (their reservation val-
ues for crime opportunities), is endogenous and depends on their labor status, current and future
expected incomes, the probability of apprehension as well as the expected jail sentence if caught.
We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under simple conditions. The model gener-
ates crime rates that differ across labor force status - the unemployed have the highest propensity
to commit crime compared to being employed - a feature that is present in the data. The tractabil-
ity of the model allows us to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the effects that changing labor
market policies (such as unemployment beneﬁts, wage and hiring subsidies) have on the equilib-
rium. For example, a change in unemployment beneﬁts has different effects on unemployed and
employed workers in terms of crime behavior, but the sum of those effects is quantitatively small.
Wage subsidies lead to a lower unemployment rate, lower crime rates and higher welfare. We also
investigated how crime policies (policies to reduce the availability of crimes, to catch criminals
estimate for the cost functionC(π).
40The optimal value for δ is small, less than 0.035. As indicated earlier, this result depends on our assumption that
λe = λu = λo as well as our estimate for the cost of maintaining an individual in jail.
32and punishments) affect the labor market. It is shown that quantitatively crime policies have little
effects on labor market outcomes but they have large effects on crime behaviors.
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3710 Appendix A. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1 According to Nash’s axioms, (φ,w) must be pairwise Pareto-efﬁcient. Since
the up-front payment φ allows the worker and the ﬁrm to transfer utility perfectly, the wage, w,
must be chosen to maximize the total surplus of the match. The comparison of (6) and (11) shows
that the match surplus is maximized iff Vf = 0. From (8), Vf = 0 requires w = y. Finally, the
ﬁrst-order condition of (12) with respect to φ yields (14).
Proof of Lemma 2 The slope ofCS in the (εu,θ) space is
dθ
dεu






The slope of JC in the (εu,θ) space is
dθ
dεu
















it is easy to see that
dθ
dεu























From (46), it can be checked that θ is a strictly decreasing function of εu. So if a solution to (17)
and (46) exists then it is unique. Denote εu(θ) the solution εu to the equation (17). Since b−x > 0



























So if (28) holds then Γ(0) > 0. Furthermore, Γ(∞) = −∞. Therefore, a solution to Γ(θ) = 0 exists
and it is such that θ >0. Given θ, (17) gives a unique εu and (60) yields a unique εe. Finally, given







where u is deﬁned in (26).
Finally, the result according to which εe > εu comes from (21).
Proof of Proposition 2 From Proposition 1, no crime occurs in equilibrium iff εu ≥ ¯ ε. From (20)
if εu ≥ ¯ ε then θ = ˆ θ. From (17) the condition εu ≥ ¯ ε requires (30).
Proof of Proposition 3 For any exogenous m, Proposition 1 has established that an equilibrium
exists and is unique. Hence, there exists a unique triple [εe(m),εu(m),θ(m)] and θ(m) > 0 if (28)
holds. With endogenous m, we look for the following ﬁxed point:
µ[εe(m),εu(m),θ(m)] = m (47)
From(28), ify>bthenθ(0)>0andhence µ[εe(0),εu(0),θ(0)]>0. Furthermore, µ[εe(m),εu(m),θ(m)]
is a continuous and bounded function of m. Hence, there exists a m > 0 solution to (47).
Proof of Proposition 5 The pair (εu,θ) is uniquely determined by (17) and (46). Differentiating
these two equations, it is straightforward to show that dεu/db > 0 and dθ/db < 0 . From (18) the
sign of dεe/db is the same as s−δ.
Proof of Proposition 6 The pair (εu,θ) is determined by (17) and (46). Differentiating these two
equations one can establish that dθ/dβ < 0. In order to determine the effects on εu we adopt the



































on the RHS of (48) in-
creases in β if β < η(θ). Differentiating (48) and (49) one can show that dεu/dβ > 0 if β < η(θ)
and dεu/dβ < 0 if β > η(θ). To determine the effect of an increase in β on εe we use (18) which









From (49) there is a negative relationship between εu and ˜ γ. Therefore, sign(dεe/dβ) =sign[(s−
δ)dεu/dβ].
Proof of Proposition 7 As ϕ increases the curve associated with (45) moves upward in the space
(εu,θ) while the curve associated with (17) is unaffected. Thus, both εu and θ increase. From (21)
εe increases.
Proof of Proposition 8 Following the proof of Proposition 6, we adopt the following change

























where p(θ) = θq(θ) and ◦ is the composition operator. Equation (51) gives a positive relationship
between εu and ˜ γ while (52) deﬁnes a negative relationship between εu and ˜ γ. It can be checked
from (51) and (52) that dεu/dγ < 0 and d ˜ γ/dγ > 0. From (18) the sign of dεe/d ˜ γ is the same as
δ −s. Finally, from (17) εu increases if θγ increases which implies dθ/dγ < 0.
40Proof of Proposition 9 Equation (17) is independent of y or s. Therefore, it is easy to show from
(17) and (46) that both θ and εu increase following an increase in y or a decrease in s. From (21)


















4111 Appendix B: The model with a constant wage and no hiring
fee
In this Appendix a version of the model where employment contracts are restricted to ﬂat wages.
To keep the description as close as possible to Pissarides (2000), the wage is set to split the surplus
from the match between the worker and the ﬁrm. It solves:
(1−β)(Ve−Vu) = βVf, (53)
where β ∈ [0,1] is the worker’s share in the match surplus.41 From (7) and the fact that Vv = 0







The average recruiting cost of a ﬁrm, the left-hand side of (54), is equal to the expected proﬁts
of a ﬁlled job, the right-hand side of (54). Notice that the job destruction rate is endogenous and
depends on the employed worker’s crime behavior.
Let us turn to the determination of the equilibrium wage. From (53) and the fact that Vf =


























41It should be emphasized that this wage mechanism is not the outcome of an axiomatic bargaining solution (like
Nash). As discussed in Shimer (2005b) and Bonilla and Burdett (2005), in the presence of search on the job (in
our case, search for crime opportunities) the bargaining set may not be convex which prevents the use of standard
bargaining solutions. Here, we follow Pissarides (1994) who uses an arbitrary rent sharing rule in a model with search
on the job.
42Notice from (57) that the wage depends on the availability of crime opportunities for unemployed
and employed workers. For instance, if λu = λe then the wage is larger than the one that prevails
in the no-crime economy (for given θ). This is so because the presence of crime opportunities
reduces the difference between the value of an employed worker and the value of an unemployed
one.
Now, we can ﬁnd the equilibrium condition for the supply of vacancies. Substitute w by its























where g(ε) is the density function of G(ε). For given crime thresholds, (58) determines a unique
value for market tightness.
Crime decisions are determined as follows. Using the Bellman equations (2), (3) and (4), as




























Deﬁnition. A steady-state equilibrium with a rent sharing rule and no hiring fee is a list {θ, εu,
εe, ne, nu, np} such that: θ satisﬁes (58); {εu, εe} satisﬁes (59)-(60); {ne, nu, np} satisﬁes (23)-(25)
and τ that satisﬁes (27).
The model can be solved recursively. Equation (59) gives a positive relationship –called the
crime schedule– between εu and θ. Indeed, from (59),
dθ
dεu


























































The sign of this expression is ambiguous. For a given solution (εu,θ) to (59) and (62), one can
easily ﬁnd the other endogenous variables.





[1−G(ε)]dε > 0. (63)

































u is the value of εu that solves (59) when θ = 0. From (63), Γ(0) < 0. Furthermore,
Γ(∞) = ∞. Hence, by continuity of the function Γ(θ), there exists a θ > 0 solution to Γ(θ) = 0.
If m is endogenous and depends on the labor market outcome, as in Proposition 3, equilibrium
exists provided that y > b. We cannot use the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2 to
establish uniqueness. We can only show uniqueness for some particular cases. For instance, if









guarantees that the crime schedule and the job creation schedule cannot intersect more than once
in the (εu,θ) space.
In order to illustrate the role of the hiring fee in our benchmark model, we revisit the quan-
titative effects of the experiments above. In general, the ﬁndings are not considerably different
44from those with a hiring fee and therefore display the relevant tables without discussion. Table 9
provides a summary of the parameters that were recalibrated, Table 10 examines a change in un-
employment benﬁts, Table 11 examines a change in bargaining power, Table 12 examines a change
in hiring subsidies and Table 13 examines a change in criminal apprehension.
Table 9: Parameters
µh 0.844 mean of exponential home utility distribution
γ 0.513 recruiting cost
λe = λu = λo 0.400 ﬂow of crime opportunities
µg 0.0189 mean of exponential crime distribution
Table 10: Effects of Changing Unemployment Beneﬁts (b)
b
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Labor Force
Employed (%) 61 61 61 61 61
Unemployed (%) 4 4 5 5 6
Not in Labor Force (%) 34 34 34 34 33
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.051
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.063 0.062 0.061 0.06 0.058
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021
Total Crime Rate 42.8 42.7 42.4 42.2 41.7
Change in Welfare -0.05% -0.01% – -0.02% -0.1%
45Table 11: Changes in Bargaining Power, (β)
β 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.95 0.99
¯ w 0.681 0.829 0.876 0.957 0.986 0.991 0.997
Labor Force
Employed (%) 55% 61% 62% 61% 52% 46% 27%
Unemployed (%) 1% 1% 2% 5% 12% 17% 28%
Not in Labor Force (%) 45% 38% 36% 34% 36% 38% 45%
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.082 0.071 0.066 0.052 0.029 0.018 0.001
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.083 0.073 0.07 0.061 0.049 0.041 0.017
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.016 0.012 0.004
Total Crime Rate 57.8 53.9 51.6 42.4 26.5 19.7 6.8
Change in Welfare -10.85% -4.52% -2.49% – -2.51% -4.62% -11.42%
Table 12: Effects of Hiring Subsidies (γ)
γ
0.31 0.41 0.51 0.61 0.71
Labor Force
Employed (%) 63 62 61 61 60
Unemployed (%) 4 4 5 5 5
Not in Labor Force (%) 33 34 34 34 34
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.055 0.054 0.052 0.051 0.05
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.062 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.06
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
Total Crime Rate 44.6 43.5 42.4 41.6 40.8
Change in Welfare -0.14% -0.03% – -0.02% -0.07%
46Table 13: Changes in Criminal Apprehension(π)
π
0.017 0.018 0.019 0.02 0.021
Labor Force
Employed (%) 61 61 61 61 61
Unemployed (%) 5 5 5 5 5
Not in Labor Force (%) 34 34 34 34 34
Crime
Pr(Commit Crime | e) 0.065 0.058 0.052 0.047 0.042
Pr(Commit Crime | u) 0.074 0.067 0.061 0.055 0.05
Pr(Commit Crime | o) 0.029 0.026 0.022 0.02 0.017
Total Crime Rate 53 47.5 42.4 38 34.1
Change in Welfare -0.02% -0.01% – 0.01% 0.02%
47